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TARGET ARTICLE 
Implicit Theories and Their Role in Judgments and Reactions: 
A World From Two Perspectives 
Carol S. Dweck, Chi-yue Chiu, and Ying-yi Hong 
Columbia University 
In this target article, we present evidence for a new model of individual differences in 
judgments and reactions. The model holds thatpeople's implicit theories about human 
attributes structure the way they understand and react to human actions and outcomes. 
We review research showing that when people believe that attributes (such as 
intelligence or moral character) are fixed, trait-like entities (an entity theory), they 
tend to understand outcomes and actions in terms of these fixed traits ("I failed the 
test because Iarn dumb" or "He stole the bread because he is dishonest"). In contrast, 
when people believe that attributes are more dynamic, malleable, and developable 
(an incremental theory), they tend to focus less on broad traits and, instead, tend to 
understand outcomes and actions in terms of more specific behavioral orpsycholog- 
icaE mediators ( " I  failed the test because of my effort or strategy" or "He stole the 
bread because he was desperate"). The two frameworks also appear to foster different 
reactions: helpless versus mastery-oriented responses to personal setbacks and an 
emphasis on retribution versus education or rehabilitation for transgressions. These 
findings are discussed in terms of their implications for personality, motivation, and 
social perception. 
In this target article, we describe a theoretical model 
of how implicit beliefs influence people's inferences, 
judgments, and reactions, particularly in the face of 
negative events. Our model finds its intellectual roots 
in Kelly's (1955) theory of personality and in Heider's 
(1958) field theory of social perception. According to 
Kelly, a major component of personality involves per- 
sonal constructs or naive assumptions about the self and 
the social reality. In his view, just as the implicit as- 
sumptions of a scientific model guide the interpretation 
of scientific findings, the implicit assumptions of a 
naive model guide the way information about the self 
and other people is processed and understood. This 
strong emphasis on the role of lay theories in guiding 
social information processing is also found in Heider' s 
(1958) theory of social perception. To Heider, lay 
people's latent theories of personality influence the 
way the self and other people are perceived (see also 
Jones & Thibaut, 1958). Recently, the role of implicit 
theories in the organization and interpretation of infor- 
mation has gained increasing acceptance among both 
cognitive and social psychologists (e.g., Carey & 
Smith, 1993; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Epstein, 1989; 
Medin, 1989; Medin & Wattenmaker, 1987; Murphy & 
Medin, 1985; M. Ross, 1989; Wittenbrink, Gist, & 
Hilton, 1993; see also Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1994). 
Because people's theories are largely implicit or 
poorly articulated, systematic effort is required on the 
part of behavioral scientists to identify them and to map 
out their effects. With our research, we have sought to 
identify key implicit beliefs and to establish their rele- 
vance for the processing of social information. This 
research has led to the identification of implicit theories 
that we believe set up a framework for analyzing and 
interpreting human actions. These implicit theories 
refer to the two different assumptions people may make 
about the malleability of personal attributes; they may 
believe that a highly valued personal attribute, such as 
intelligence or morality, is a fixed, nonmalleable trait- 
like entity (entity theory), or they may believe that the 
attribute is a malleable quality that can be changed and 
developed (incremental theory). To illustrate, an entity 
theory of intelligence is the belief that intelligence is a 
fixed trait, a personal quality that cannot be changed. 
Individuals who subscribe to this theory believe that 
although people can learn new things, their underlying 
intelligence remains the same. In contrast, an incremen- 
tal theory of intelligence conceives of intelligence as 
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cultivatable (i.e., individuals may become more intelli- 
gent through their efforts). 
In this article, we present a model that spells out the 
cognitive and behavioral consequences of the two the- 
ories. In overview, the basic assumption of the model 
is that conceiving of personal attributes as fixed traits 
sets up an emphasis on traits for understanding behav- 
ior. That is, an entity theorist, more than an incremental 
theorist, tends to understand a person's behaviors or 
outcomes in terms of the person's fixed traits. In con- 
trast, conceiving of personal attributes as dynamic, 
malleable qualities may lessen the importance of traits 
in understanding behavior and prime an analysis of 
more specific factors (e.g., needs, goals, intentions, 
emotional states, prior behaviors) that mediate behav- 
ior or outcomes. For example, as we see in this article, 
those who hold an entity theory of intelligence are more 
likely to blame their intelligence for negative out- 
comes, whereas those who hold an incremental theory 
of intelligence are more likely to understand the same 
negative outcomes in terms of their effort or strategy. 
Consider a scenario in which someone stole some bread 
from a bakery. To one who holds an entity theory of 
moral character (who believes in fixed moral charac- 
ter), understanding this action may involve diagnosing 
the actor's moral traits. But for one who holds an 
incremental theory of moral character (who does not 
believe in broad, fixed moral traits), the actor's overall 
moral character may not be as pertinent as the need, 
goal, or intention that drove the act. To summarize, in 
our model, holding an entity versus incremental theory 
leads to a differential emphasis on traits versus more 
specific psychological or behavioral mediators in un- 
derstanding human actions and outcomes. 
This differential emphasis on traits versus specific 
mediators in turn fosters different reactions to negative 
events and negative behavior. For example, our re- 
search has shown that entity theorists of intelligence are 
more likely than incremental theorists to react help- 
lessly in the face of achievement setbacks (Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988; Henderson & Dweck, 1990). That is, 
they are not only more likely to make negative judg- 
ments about their intelligence from the failures, but also 
more likely to show negative affect and debilitation. In 
contrast, incremental theorists, who focus more on 
behavioral factors (e.g., effort, problem-solving strate- 
gies) as causes of negative achievement outcomes, tend 
to act on these mediators (e.g., to try harder, develop 
better strategies) and to continue to work toward mas- 
tery of the task. 
More recently, we have obtained analogous findings 
relating implicit theories of personality and moral char- 
acter to how people judge and react to others' behaviors 
(Dweck, in press; Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993). Spe- 
cifically, relative to their incremental counterparts, en- 
tity theorists of personality or moral character not only 
tend to judge people's social or moral traits from a small 
sample of behaviors ('just as entity theorists of intelli- 
gence judge their own intellectual ability from a small 
sample of outcomes) but, once they have judged some- 
one for a negative behavior, they tend to focus on 
meting out the punishment deserved by a person with 
these negative traits. In contrast, not only do incremen- 
tal theorists tend to focus more on mediating processes 
and less on trait judgments, but they also tend to focus 
more on educating or reforming (vs. punishing) a trans- 
gressor in ways that are consistent with their media- 
tional analyses (and with their theory about the 
malleability of attributes). 
In summary, we discuss the cognitive and behavioral 
patterns associated with adopting different implicit the- 
ories. Using findings from our research on self-judg- 
ments and reactions in the intellectual domain, and 
social judgments and reactions in the social and moral 
domains, we argue that each theory offers an analytic 
framework that sets up different interpretations and 
reactions, whether people are confronting their own 
outcomes or other people's actions. However, because 
the implicit theories we examine in this article are 
relatively recent constructs in the literature, it is import- 
ant to lay out in some detail the nature of these con- 
structs and to deal with some of the issues pertinent to 
their assessment. 
Implicit Theories: Their Nature and 
Assessment 
Implicit Theories as Core Assumptions 
The belief in fixed versus malleable human attributes 
can be seen as a core assumption in an individual's 
world view (see also Whitehead, 1938). It is analogous 
to a superordinate construct in Kelly's (1955) theory in 
that it is an assumption that defines the individual's 
reality and imparts meaning to events. Consistent with 
the idea that implicit theories are core assumptions, we 
do not see implicit theories as rigidly determining 
people's behavior. Instead, we see them as creating a 
framework and then fostering judgments and reactions 
that are consistent with that framework. 
It is also important to note that neither theory is the 
"correct" one. We view these theories simply as alter- 
native ways of constructing reality, each with its poten- 
tial costs and benefits. For example, an entity theory, 
with its emphasis on static traits that can be readily 
assessed and that are highly predictive of future behav- 
ior, constructs for its subscribers a relatively parsimo- 
nious and knowable reality. However, at times, the 
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simplicity of an entity theory can lead too quickly to 
global trait judgments and helpless coping styles. In 
contrast, an incremental theory, with its emphasis on 
more specific process analysis, offers its subscribers a 
more complex but less knowable reality. It is a theory 
that often fosters effective persistence in the face of 
obstacles, but the possibilities for change assumed in 
the theory also imply that the reality can never be 
known with any finality. Thus, the goal of our research 
is not to evaluate the correctness of the two theories, 
but to demonstrate that holding one view or the other 
has potentially important consequences for people. 
Finally, we want to emphasize that people need not 
have one sweeping theory that cuts across all human 
attributes. Indeed, our research shows that although 
some people do have one very generalized theory, 
others have different theories of different attributes- 
believing, for example, that intelligence is fixed but 
moral character is malleable (as is mentioned next). In 
this latter case, the entity theory will provide the frame- 
work for thought and action in the intellectual domain, 
whereas the incremental theory will provide the frame- 
work that structures issues relating to moral character. 
In this sense, then, we are dealing not with ageneralized 
cognitive style, but with domain-specific conceptual 
frameworks. Thus, in this article, when we refer to an 
entity theory or an incremental theory, we are always 
referring to the person's theory about the attribute or 
domain in question. 
Assessment of Implicit Theories 
The measures. The research reviewed in this arti- 
cle focuses on how implicit theories in the domains of 
intelligence and morality are related to judgments and 
reactions in these domains. In this research, partici- 
pants' entity versus incremental theory in each domain 
was assessed by a three-item questionnaire. Only three 
items are used because implicit theory is a construct 
with a simple unitary theme, and repeatedly rephrasing 
the same idea may lead to confusion and boredom on 
the part of the respondents. One possible disadvantage 
of having a small number of items in a scale is that it 
may lead to low internal reliability because, psycho- 
metrically, the internal reliability of a measure is posi- 
tively related to the number of items in the measure. 
Yet, as discussed next, the high internal reliabilities of 
the measures we obtained across studies suggest that 
this is not a problem. 
The three items in the implicit theory of intelligence 
measure are (a) "You have a certain amount of intelli- 
gence and you really can't do much to change it"; (b) 
"Your intelligence is something about you that you 
can't change very much"; and (c) "You can learn new 
things, but you can't really change your basic intelli- 
gence." Respondents indicated their agreement with 
these statements on a 6-point scale from 1 (strongly 
agree) to 6 (strongly disagree). 
To score this questionnaire, scores on the three items 
are averaged to form an overall implicit theory score 
(ranging from 1 to 6), with a higher score indicating a 
stronger incremental theory. Most typically, to ensure 
that only participants with clear theories are included, 
participants are classified as entity theorists if their 
overall implicit theory score is 3.0 or below and classi- 
fied as incremental theorists if their overall score is 4.0 
or above. Using this criterion, about 15% of the partic- 
ipants are typically excluded, and the remaining 85% 
tend to be evenly distributed between the two implicit 
theory groups. Because only 15% of the participants are 
excluded, the two theory groups do not represent ex- 
treme groups. 
The implicit theory of morality measure has the same 
format and scoring method as the implicit theory of 
intelligence. The items in this measure are (a) "A 
person's moral character is something very basic about 
them and it can't be changed very much," (b) "Whether 
a person is responsible and sincere or not is deeply 
ingrained in theirpersonality. It cannot be changed very 
much," and (c) "There is not much that can be done to 
change a person's moral traits (e.g., conscientiousness, 
uprightness and honesty)." 
As noted, implicit theories are conceptually domain 
specific. Indeed, at the assessment level, endorsing an 
entity theory of one attribute is statistically independent 
of endorsing an entity theory of a different attribute (as 
is discussed next). However, in some studies, the issues 
being addressed cut across domains. In these studies, 
instead of assessing the participants' implicit theories 
in a particular domain, we measure their entity versus 
incremental theory of the person as a whole. This 
measure has the same format and scoring method as the 
other two implicit theory measures. The items in this 
implicit person theory measure are (a) "The kind of 
person someone is something very basic about them 
and it can't be changed very much;" (b) "People can do 
things differently, but the important parts of who they 
are can't really be changed;" and "Everyone is a certain 
kind of person and there is not much that can be done 
to really change that." 
Reliability. Tables 1 to 5 present the data from six 
validation studies on the reliability and validity of the 
theory measures just described. As shown in Table 1, 
across studies, the implicit theory measures had high 
internal reliability (a ranged from .94 to .98 for the 
implicit theory of intelligence, .85 to .94 for the implicit 
theory of morality, and .90 to .96 for implicit person 
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theory). The test-retest reliability of the measures over 
a 2-week interval was .80 for the intelligence theory 
measure, .80 for the morality theory measure, and .82 
for the implicit person theory measure. 
Validity. Before we present the data on the valid- 
ity of the measures, several issues concerning the for- 
mat of the measures should be addressed. First, items 
depicting an incremental theory are not included in our 
implicit theory measures. This is the case because in 
past studies (Boyum, 1988; Leggett, 1985), even 
among respondents who endorsed items depicting an 
entity theory, many endorsed items depicting the oppo- 
site incremental theory and drifted toward incremental 
choices over items. This suggests that incremental 
items are highly compelling. However, the issue of 
whether disagreement with the entity theory statements 
could be taken to represent agreement with the incre- 
mental theory needed to be addressed. Therefore, in a 
study by Henderson (l990), respondents were given the 
implicit theory of intelligence measure and asked to 
explain their answers. Those who disagreed with the 
entity statements gave clear incremental theory justifi- 
cations for their responses. We obtained the same re- 
sults in another validation study employing both the 
morality theory measure and the implicit person theory 
measure. 
Second, because endorsement of an entity theory 
requires agreement with the items, another issue that 
requires attention is whether agreement with these 
statements represents an acquiescence set. To ad- 
dress this issue, factor analyses were performed on 
the items in our validation studies from (a) the intel- 
ligence theory measure, (b) the morality theory mea- 
sure, and (c) the world theory measure we developed 
for other research. (Items of the world theory mea- 
sure are shown in Table 2.) Because these three 
implicit theory measures have the same format, and 
if endorsement of the items represents an acquies- 
cence set, then a single factor with heavy loadings 
from all nine items should emerge from the factor 
analysis. However, as shown in Table 2, across the 
five validation studies, the three implicit theory mea- 
sures formed clear separate factors. This consistent 
finding suggests that (a) endorsement of the implicit 
theory items does not represent an acquiescence set 
Table 1. Summary Statistics and Reliability of the Implicit Theory Measures 
--  -
M~ SD Internal Reliability 
Study 1 Test (N = 69) 
Kind of Person 
Morality 
Intelligence 
Retest (N = 62) 
Kind of Person 
(2-Week Test-Retest, r = 32)  
Morality 
(2-week Test-Retest, r = 30 )  
Intelligence 
(2-Week Test-Retest, r = .80) 
Study 2 (N= 184) 
Kind of Person 
Morality 
Intelligence 
Study 3 (N = 139) 
Morality 
Intelligence 
Study 4 (N = 121) 
Morality 
Intelligence 
Study 5 (N = 93) 
Kind of Person 
Morality 
Intelligence 
Study 6 (N = 32) 
Kind of Person 
Morality 
Intelligence 
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Table 2. Factor Analyses of the Implicit Theory Measures 
Factor Loadings 
Items 
Study 1 (Test) Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5 
F1 F3 F2 F1 F3 F2 F1 F2 F3 Fl  F2 F3 F l  F3 F2 
Intelligence 
1. You have a certain amount of intelligence 
and you really can't do much to change it. 
2. Your intelligence is something about you 
that you can't change very much. 
3. You can learn new things, but you can't 
really change your basic intelligence. 93 
Morality 
1. A person's moral character is something 
very basic about them and it can't be 14 
changed much. 
2. Whether a person is responsible and 
sincere or not is deeply ingrained in their 
personality. It cannot be changed very 15 
much. 
3. There is not much that can be done to 
change a person's moral traits (e.g., 
conscientiousness, uprightness, and 
honesty). 16 
World 
1. Though we can change some phenomena, 
it is unlikely that we can alter the core 
dispositions of our world. 
2. Our world has its basic or ingrained 
dispositions, and you really can't do much 
to change them. 
3. Some societal trends may dominate for 
while, but the fundamental nature of our 
world is something that cannot be changed 
much. 
Note: Factor analysis was not performed on the theory measures in Study 6 because of relatively small sample-to-item ratio. 
and (b) as we propose, implicit theories about different 
human attributes are statistically independent. 
Because the implicit person theory measure was not 
included in some validation studies, it was not included 
in the factor analysis. Yet, conceptually, as a measure 
of entity versus incremental belief about the person as 
a whole, the implicit person theory should correlate 
with the intelligence theory and the morality theory and 
yet be independent of the implicit world theory. For the 
studies in which data were available, this was indeed 
the case. For example, in Study 1, the implicit person 
theory was regressed on the other three implicit theory 
measures in a multiple regression analysis. As ex- 
pected, the R2 for the regression model was high (R2 = 
.78) and the implicit person theory was significantly 
predicted by the intelligence theory (0 = .32, p = .0001) 
and the morality theory (P = .57, p < .0001), but not by 
the world theory (P = .08,p = .33). In short, the implicit 
person theory measure was related to other implicit 
theory measures in a conceptually meaningful way. 
Moreover, the lack of correlation between implicit 
person theory and implicit world theory again suggests 
that an acquiescence set is not a problem in the assess- 
ment of implicit theories. 
Tables 3 to 5 present other data from the six valida- 
tion studies. Tables 3 and 5 show that implicit theory 
measures are independent of the respondents' sex and 
age. Table 3 also shows that the intelligence theory 
measure and the morality theory measure are indepen- 
dent of the respondents' political affiliation and reli- 
gion. Tables 4 and 5 show that the three theory 
measures are not confounded with self-presentation 
concerns as measured by the Snyder (1974) Self-Mon- 
itoring Scale and the Paulhus (1984) Social Desirability 
Scale. As far as discriminant validity is concerned, the 
three theory measures are unrelated to measures of 
cognitive ability (Scholastic Aptitude Test scores), 
confidence in intellectual ability (see Hong, Chiu, & 
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Table 3. Measures of Implicit Theories of Morality and Intelligence and Their Relation to the Demographic 
Characteristics of the Respondents. 
Response: Theory of Morality Model Estimated Parameters 
Study 4 - Sexa + Age p (sex) = -.041, ns 
p (age) = -.007, ns 
Study 5 - Sex + Age p (sex) = -. 170, ns 
p (age) = ,049, ns 
Study 3 - Political ~f f i l ia t ion~ + Religious PreferenceC + p (Pol. Affl.) = -.204, ns 
Church ~t tendance~ + Importance of Religione F (Rel. Pref.) < 1.0, ns 
p (Imp. of Rel.) = .089, ns 
Response: Theory of Intelligence Model Estimated Parameters 
Study 4 - Sex + Age p (sex) = -.093, ns 
p (age) = ,032, ns 
Study 5 - Sex + Age p (sex) = -.255, ns 
P (age) = .120, ns 
Study 3 - Political Affiliation + Religious Preference + p (Pol. Affl.) = .096, ns 
Church Attendance + Importance of Religion F (Rel. Pref.) < 1 .O, ns 
p (Church Att.) = .181, ns 
p (Imp. of Rel.) = .295, ns 
b 
aFemale coded as 1, male coded as 2. 1 = Democrats, 2 = independents, 3 = Republicans. 'Categories of religious 
d preferences: Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Other. 1 = every week, 2 = almost every week, 3 = once or twice a month, 4 = a 
few times a year, 5 = never. = not important, 2 = somewhat important, 3 = very important 
Table 4. Construct Validity of the Implicit Theory Measures: Morality and Intelligence 
Predictor 
Response Variable Study Number Theory of Morality Theory of Intelligence 
- - 
Self-presentational Concerns 
Self-Monitoring (Snyder, 1974) 5 p = -.208, ns p = ,040, ns 
Social Desirability Scale (Paulhus, 1984) 6 p = .399, ns p = .024, ns 
Cognitive Ability 
SAT Scores (Quantitative and Verbal) 5 p=-7.13,ns p=-11.03,ns 
Confidence in the Self 
Confidence in Intellectual Abilitya 2 p = -.082, ns p = -.OOl, ns 
6 p = ,0100, ns p = -.056, ns 
Self-Esteem Inventory (Coopersmith, 1967) 2 p = -.047, ns p = ,391, ns 
Locus of Control 
Control by Internal Factors (Levenson, 1974) 4 p = .063, ns p =  .lSO, 
p . 0 1  
Control by Powerful Others (Levenson, 1974) 4 p =-.141, ns p = ,059, ns 
Control by Chance (Levenson, 1974) 4 p = .055, ns p = -. 114, ns 
Optimism 
Confidence in Other People's  orali it^^ 6 p=-.051,ns p =  .llO,ns 
Confidence in the WorldC 6 p = -.l50, ns p=-1.71,ns 
Social Political Attitudes 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981) 6 p = -.040, ns p = -.078, ns 
Political Conservatism (Kerlinger, 1984, Social Attitude Scale) 6 p = -.021, ns /3 = -.064, ns 
Political Conservatism (Kerlinger, 1984, Referent Scale) 6 p = ,082, ns p = -.087, ns 
Political Liberalism (Kerlinger, 1984, Social Attitude Scale) 6 p = -.130, ns p = ,101, ns 
Political Liberalism (Kerlinger, 1984, Referent Scale) 6 p = .095, ns p = -.079, ns 
a~onfidence in ability was assessed by items such as "I usually think I'm intelligent" versus "I wonder if I'm intelligent." 
b~onfidence in other people's morality was assessed by items such as "I believe that most people will take advantage of others 
if they can" versus "I believe that most people are trustworthy." 'Confidence in the world was assessed by items such as "I 
feel good about the world and the way it is" versus "I do not feel good about the world and the way it is." 
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Table 5. Construct Validity of the Implicit Person 
Theory Measure , 
Correlation 
Age 
Sexa 
Self-Presentational Concerns 
Self-Monitoring Scale 
Social Desirability Scale 
Cognitive Abilities 
SAT Scores (Qunatitative & Verbal) 
Confidence and Optimism 
Confidence in Intellectual ~ b i l i t ~ ~  
Self-esteem Inventory 
Confidence in Other Peo le's  orali it^^ 
Confidence in the World k' 
Political Attitudes 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 
1981) 
Political Conservatism 
Social Attitude Scale (Kerlinger, 1984) 
Referent Scale (Kerlinger, 1984) 
Political Liberalism 
Social Attitudal Scale (Kerlinger, 1984) 
Referent Scale (Kerlinger, 1984) 
b a~emale = 1, male = 2. See Table 4 Note. 
Dweck, in press), self-esteem (Coopersmith, 1967), 
optimism or confidence in other people and the world 
(Chiu & Dweck, 1994), social-political attitudes such 
as authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981), and political 
conservatism or liberalism (Kerlinger, 1984). 
Finally, the morality theory measure is independent 
of the locus of control subscales, although a modest but 
significant association was found between a belief in 
internal control and an incremental theory of intelli- 
gence. This correlation is not surprising given that 
individuals who expect their ability to be malleable and 
controllable may also expect themselves to have greater 
control over their personal outcomes. 
In summary, the implicit theory measures appear to 
be reliable and valid measures of the constructs. Having 
addressed these assessment issues, we return to the 
question of how subscribing to an entity versus incre- 
mental theory might affect individuals' judgments and 
reactions to negative events. 
Self- Judgments of Intelligence and 
Reactions to Achievement Setbacks 
Self-Judgments of Intelligence 
The most long-standing program of research in our 
laboratory addresses self-judgments of ability and re- 
sponses to achievement setbacks. In this research, 
participants' theories of intelligence are assessed and 
then, in a separate session, their self-judgments and 
reactions in the face of actual or hypothetical achieve- 
ment setbacks are monitored. As noted earlier, across 
studies (e.g., Henderson & Dweck, 1990; Hong & 
Dweck, 1992; Zhao & Dweck, 1994), individuals who 
believe that intelligence is a fixed trait show a greater 
tendency to blame their intellectual ability when they 
encounter achievement failures than do those who be- 
lieve it is a malleable quality. Incremental theorists, by 
contrast, make more inferences about the specific fac- 
tors that may have mediated the negative outcomes 
(effort and strategies). It is important to note that, in this 
context, the two theory groups do not make different 
inferences following failure because entity theorists are 
less able than incremental theorists. In fact, prior to 
receiving negative feedback, the intellectual task per- 
formance of entity theorists, as a group, is entirely 
equivalent to that of incremental theorists (e.g., Hong 
& Dweck, 1992; Zhao & Dweck, 1994). 
In one study, Henderson and Dweck (1990) tracked 
students over the transition to junior high school. As 
part of this study, students were asked to make attribu- 
tions for hypothetical academic failures they might 
encounter (poor grades). As our model predicts, entity 
theorists of intelligence were significantly more likely 
than incremental theorists to attribute the failures to 
their intellectual ability, whereas incremental theorists 
were significantly more likely to attribute them to a lack 
of effort. 
In another recent study (Zhao & Dweck, 1994), 
college students were presented with three scenarios 
depicting major academic setbacks (e.g., low Graduate 
Record Examination scores) and asked, following each, 
what they would think, feel, and do. Relative to incre- 
mental theorists, entity theorists reported significantly 
more derogation of their global intellectual ability der- 
ogation (e.g., "I would think I was dumb"). In contrast, 
incremental theorists generated significantly more re- 
sponses suggesting new strategies or heightened effort 
in the future. 
Consistent results were obtained when participants' 
ability judgments were assessed by means of less ob- 
trusive measures. Hong and Dweck (1992) reasoned 
that if entity theorists made negative inferences about 
their ability following failure, then their heightened 
concern with ability should alter their reaction times to 
ability words but not to other words (cf. Bock & Klin- 
ger, 1986; Jung & Riklin, 190411973). To test this 
prediction, Hong and Dweck randomly assigned col- 
lege students to either a failure condition or a baseline 
condition. In the failure condition, participants took an 
intellectual ability test and received failure feedback. 
In the baseline condition, which was designed to pro- 
vide a baseline measure of reactions to ability words, 
DWECK, CHIU, & HONG 
they proceeded directly to the reaction time task-an 
adjective decision task. On this task, participants were 
instructed to decide as quickly as they could whether 
an adjective displayed on a computer screen could be 
used to characterize a person. The adjectives could be 
(a) an ability adjective (e.g., smart, stupid), (b) a non- 
ability person adjective (e.g., brave, greedy), or (c) an 
adjective that normally is not used to characterize a 
person (e.g., spacious, melodic). 
The findings supported our prediction. First, as pre- 
dicted, in the failure condition, entity theorists' re- 
sponse times to ability adjectives differed significantly 
from those of incremental theorists, suggesting that 
entity theorists had indeed made ability inferences. The 
findings also showed that this difference was not due 
to a generalized reaction to failure among entity theo- 
rists, because there were no differences between the 
two theory groups in their responses to other adjectives 
following failure. Furthermore, this difference was not 
due to a chronic responsivity to ability words on the part 
of entity theorists because in the baseline condition, the 
two theory groups' response times to the ability adjec- 
tives were identical. 
In summary, these studies supported the hypothesis 
that having an entity theory predicts a concern about 
one's ability and is associated with global ability judg- 
ments after negative performance outcomes. Having an 
incremental theory, by contrast, is associated with a 
relative deemphasis of trait judgments or explanations 
and with afocus on the more specific behavioral factors 
(e.g., effort and strategies) that may mediate negative 
outcomes. 
Goals 
Another source of evidence for the hypothesis that 
an entity theory engenders a greater concern with traits 
and trait judgments comes from studies linking 
students' theories of intelligence to their achievement 
goals (Bandura & Dweck, 1985; Dweck & Leggett, 
1988). In these studies, students' theories of intelli- 
gence were assessed, and at a later point, they were 
given a choice of tasks to work on. Some of the tasks 
embodied performance goals in that they provided 
students with opportunities to gain positive judgments 
of their intellectual ability and avoid negative judg- 
ments (but did not give them the opportunity to learn 
anything new). Other tasks embodied learning goals in 
that they provided an opportunity for students to in- 
crease their ability, but it was at the risk of exposing 
ignorance and drawing negative judgments of their 
intellectual competence. Results from both studies 
showed that students holding an entity theory of intel- 
ligence, significantly more than those holding an incre- 
mental theory, chose the performance goal tasks--ones 
that ensured the desired competence judgments-but at 
the sacrifice of a meaningful learning opportunity. 
These studies, then, like the foregoing ones, indicate 
that entity theorists focus more on judgments of their 
intellectual ability in achievement situations than do 
incremental theorists. 
Reactions to Setbacks 
One well-documented phenomenon in the literature 
on achievement motivation is that when individuals 
encounter achievement setbacks, some respond in a 
mastery-oriented manner, whereas others respond 
helplessly (Diener & Dweck, 1978, 1980). More spe- 
cifically, the mastery-oriented pattern is characterized 
by afocus on effort and strategies, along with persistent 
striving and generation of new problem-solving strate- 
gies. The helpless response pattern, by contrast, is 
characterized by negative self-judgments, along with 
negative affect, a lack of persistence, and performance 
decrements. 
Our research to date has shown that subscribing to 
an entity theory of intelligence predicts not only global 
ability judgments in the face of failure but also a less 
adaptive, helpless pattern of coping. In a study by 
Henderson and Dweck (1990), students were followed 
through their transition to junior high school. It was 
reasoned that over this transition, when schoolwork 
becomes more challenging and the grading criteria 
become more stringent, achievement setbacks would 
be relatively frequent, and implicit theories of intelli- 
gence would predict gains and losses in achievement. 
Students' implicit theories of intelligence were as- 
sessed at the beginning of seventh grade (along with 
their attributions, as previously described, and their 
affective response to schoolwork). In addition, their 
sixth-grade grades and achievement test scores were 
recorded and later compared to their subsequent sev- 
enth-grade grades. The question was: How well did 
students with the different theories do in seventh grade, 
compared to how well one would have expected them 
to do on the basis of their sixth-grade performance? 
As hypothesized, the students' implicit theories of 
intelligence predicted their subsequent academic ger- 
formance. Overall, entity theorists who had received 
relatively low grades in sixth grade tended to receive 
low grades in seventh grade, and entity theorists who 
had previously earned high grades tended to show 
substantial decrements in their relative standing in sev- 
enth grade. In contrast, incremental theorists who had 
received high grades in the past tended to perform well 
in seventh grade, and many incremental theorists who 
had previously exhibited relatively low performance 
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showed a marked improvement in their standing rela- 
tive to their peers. In addition, during this transition, 
entity theorists as a group displayed more negative 
affect than did incremental theorists. For instance, they 
reported feeling more apprehensive about their school- 
work than did incremental theorists. 
Consistent with these findings, Zhao and Dweck 
(1994) showed that, when presented with hypothetical 
achievement setbacks and then asked about their 
thoughts, feelings, and possible reactions, entity theo- 
rists of intelligence were significantly more likely to 
generate responses reflecting strong negative affect and 
helpless coping reactions (such as escape from the 
situation) as compared to incremental theorists, who 
were significantly more likely to generate mastery-ori- 
ented responses (new problem-solving strategies or 
plans to exert greater effort). 
To summarize thus far, in the domain of intellectual 
achievement, individuals who believe that intelligence 
is a fixed, trait-like entity are relatively more likely to 
view achievement outcomes as indicative of their level 
of intelligence. Even a single failure, despite many 
prior successes, may be enough to govern their self- 
judgments. Moreover, this tendency toward global self- 
judgment is usually accompanied by a greater 
vulnerability to other aspects of a helpless reaction, 
such as negative affect, disrupted performance, or the 
abandonment of constructive strategies. In contrast, 
incremental theorists, who do not believe in fixed intel- 
ligence, are less likely to assess their ability via a few, 
possibly unrepresentative outcomes. Indeed, setbacks 
seem to motivate them to focus on and to address the 
specific factors (e.g., effort or strategy) that might have 
contributed to these setbacks. 
Ability attributions or global, stable self-judgments 
in the face of failure have long been associated with 
helpless responding (Abramson, Seligman, & Teas- 
dale, 1978; Diener & Dweck, 1978; Dweck, 1975; 
Weiner, 1985). This more recent work suggests that 
these global, stable attributions or inferences are them- 
selves predicted by the prior belief that one's intelli- 
gence is a fixed entity. That is, a tendency to invoke a 
fixed trait when one fails may be set up by the implicit 
theory that one possesses a fixed trait and that this trait 
is reflected in the outcome.' 
'~l though,  theoretically, there is a meaningful distinction to be 
made between trait judgments and causal trait attributions (in that the 
former refers simply to trait judgments of persons made on the basis 
of their acts or outcomes and the latter ascribes causal status to the 
trait in bringing about those acts or outcomes), we do not emphasize 
this distinction. This is because our findings have consistently shown 
similar results whether we have used simple judgments or causal 
attributions as the dependent variable. This was also true for infer- 
ences about more specific mediational processes. 
Judgment of Others and Reactions to 
Negative Social Behaviors 
Thus far, we have shown how subscribing to an 
entity theory versus incremental theory of intelligence 
may make global self-judgments and the helpless re- 
sponse pattern more likely in the domain of intellectual 
achievement. More recently, we have extended our 
model to the social-moral domain and obtained an 
analogous pattern of results. As an overview, we have 
found that compared to individuals who conceive of 
social or moral attributes as malleable qualities, indi- 
viduals who conceive of these attributes as fixed traits 
have a greater tendency to make global trait judgments 
of others (both positive and negative ones) from initial 
information about their social and moral behavior. In- 
cremental theorists of personality or morality, by con- 
trast, tend to focus more often on the more specific 
psychological factors that mediate the social and moral 
behaviors. In addition, in reaction to the negative social 
behaviors of another person, entity theorists tend to 
focus more on meting out the punishment that is appro- 
priate given the trait judgments of the target that they 
have made. In contrast, incremental theorists tend to 
focus more on education and are more likely to recom- 
mend remedial action that is in line with the media- 
tional factors they believe have produced the negative 
behaviors. 
Trait Judgments Versus Mediational 
Judgments 
Across a series of studies, we found entity theorists 
of personality and morality to have a greater tendency 
than their incremental counterparts to make disposi- 
tional trait inferences from preliminary behavioral in- 
formation. In one study (Chiu, Parker, Hong, & Dweck, 
1994; Study 3), participants were presented with a set 
of positive behaviors (e.g., risking one's life for an- 
other), negative behaviors (e.g., stealing a car), or be- 
haviors with unclear valence (e.g., making one's bed in 
the morning), each performed by a different target. 
They then judged whether these behaviors were indic- 
ative of the targets' underlying moral goodness or 
badness. As expected, entity theorists of morality con- 
sistently believed that these behaviors were signifi- 
cantly more indicative of moral traits than did 
incremental theorists. Furthermore, this result held for 
both positive behaviors and negative behaviors, as well 
as behaviors with unclear valence. That is, entity theo- 
rists were not just more negative; they also believed 
more strongly that positive behaviors were reflective of 
a person's traits. 
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Participants in this study also judged the goodness or 
badness of the behaviors. On this measure, entity 
theorists' judgments were virtually identical to those of 
incremental theorists. This indicates that entity 
theorists' more extreme trait judgments did not reflect 
a blanket tendency to be more extreme in responding 
or in judging. It shows that, although entity and incre- 
mental theorists differed clearly in the extent to which 
they would infer a person's traits from the behaviors, it 
was not because they evaluated the behaviors differ- 
ently (cf. Bassili, 1989a, 1989b; Newman & Uleman, 
1993). 
Other studies in our laboratory have shown that 
entity theorists make stronger trait inferences than do 
incremental theorists, even when there are also situa- 
tional explanations for the behaviors. For example, in 
one study (Erdley & Dweck, 1993), children were 
shown a narrated slide slow of how a new boy in school 
tried to adjust to the regime of his new classroom. In 
order to impress others and to hide his ignorance, the 
boy committed some transgressions (e.g., he told some 
lies about his background, tried to copy a neighbor's 
answers, and appropriatedleftover material from some- 
one else's project). None of these acts harmed others, 
all were accompanied by internal debates, and the 
situational pressures were underscored in the narration. 
Despite this, on measures of trait inferences adminis- 
tered to the participants after the slide show, entity 
theorists of personality made far stronger inferences 
about the target's global moral traits (bad, mean, nasty) 
than did incremental theorists. 
Consistent with this finding, Chiu, Parker, et al. 
(1994, Study 5) found that entity theorists make 
stronger trait inferences than do incremental theorists, 
even from unintentional behaviors. In one condition of 
this study, college students made judgments about tar- 
gets who perform behaviors such as "accidentally drops 
a book from a second-floor window, which almost hits 
Mrs. Brown." As predicted, entity theorists of morality 
made stronger inferences about the agents' character 
traits from the behavior than did incremental theorists. 
In yet another study, Hong (1994, Study 2) found that 
entity theorists make trait inferences even when they 
are given stimuli that depict a psychological state (an 
emotion) and even when they are not explicitly asked 
to make any trait inferences. In this study, participants 
were first shown on a computer screen five pictures of 
faces expressing positive or negative emotions (se- 
lected from Ekman & Friesen, 1975). Each picture was 
shown for 10 sec so that the participants could famil- 
iarize themselves with it. The faces were then individ- 
ually presented. However, this time, following a brief 
exposure to the face (e.g., a picture of an angry face), 
participants were presented with a trait word (mean or 
violent), a state word (furious or enraged) or a neutral 
word (matched with the trait or state word for length 
and frequency). Half of the time, the words appeared in 
their normal form, and half the time the letters were 
scrambled. The task for the participants was to judge, 
as quickly and accurately as they could, whether the 
string of letters following the picture was a word or a 
nonword. The assumption behind this task was that 
people who had made trait inferences from the faces 
should recognize and respond to the trait words more 
quickly (i.e., they should respond more quickly to a trait 
word than to a matched neutral word that followed the 
picture). Consistent with our hypothesis, only entity 
theorists showed significant facilitation of response 
time to trait words, suggesting that only entity theorists 
had indeed spontaneously made trait judgments of the 
targets in the pictures. 
Hong (1994, Study 1) also provided evidence for the 
hypothesis that entity theorists focus more on traits in 
explaining (i.e., making causal attributions for) social 
behavior and outcomes, whereas incremental theorists 
focus more on specific psychological or behavioral 
mediators. In this study, participants were presented 
with 24 sentences, 6 describing positive actions (e.g., 
"Susan volunteered once a week to teach reading to 
inner city children"), 6 describing negative actions 
(e.g., "Ben stole some bread from a bakery shop"), 6 
describing positive outcomes (e.g., "Bill was recom- 
mended highly for the job") and 6 describing negative 
outcomes (e.g., "Lee's last two relationships ended 
badly"). Participants were then asked to offer an ex- 
planation for these behaviors or outcomes by complet- 
ing the sentence, "This probably occurred because . . ." 
The explanations they generated were coded into dis- 
positional trait explanations (e.g., "She is an altruistic 
person") and psychological state explanations (e.g., 
"He is desperate"). (These two categories accounted 
for most of the explanations.) As predicted, the Im- 
plicit Theory x Causal Explanation interaction was 
significant. Consistent with the findings from the 
studies described previously, entity theorists offered 
significantly more trait explanations than did incre- 
mental theorists, and there was a trend 01 = .06) for 
incremental theorists to generate more psycholog- 
ical state explanations than entity theorists. Only 
incremental theorists generated significantly more 
psychological state explanations than trait expla- 
nations. In addition, incremental theorists offered 
significantly more behavioral mediators as expla- 
nations for the episodes depicting outcomes than 
did entity theorists. 
In summary, the studies taken together suggest that 
an entity theory of personality and moral character 
fosters trait judgments and trait attributions. whereas an 
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incremental theory promotes a focus on more specific 
mediational processes. 
Perceived Stability and Consistency of 
Trait-Relevant Behavior 
A hallmark of trait judgments is the belief that a trait 
and its allied behaviors will remain consistent over time 
and across situations (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986; Mischel, 
1990; Nisbett, 1980). When entity theorists render a 
trait judgment, are they, in line with their theory, likely 
to view it as a permanent judgment? Does a belief in 
fixed traits lead an individual to believe more strongly 
that a person who has displayed a trait-related behavior 
will act similarly in the future in a variety of situations? 
These questions were directly addressed in Erdley 
and Dweck's (1993) research on children's social judg- 
ments. Recall that in one of these studies, children 
watched a slide show of a new boy in school, in which 
the boy tried to cheat, told some lies, and appropriated 
someone else's materials in his eagerness to make a 
good impression. Children in this study were asked 
several questions about how they thought the boy 
would behave in the short-term and long-term future. 
For example, they were asked whether a slide show 
made a few weeks later (presumably giving the boy a 
chance to acclimate to his new class) would show him 
to be pretty much the same or very different. Entity and 
incremental theorists differed sharply in their responses 
to this question. Entity theorists believed that the boy 
would be pretty much the same, whereas incremental 
theorists believed that he would settle down and act 
differently with time. 
The children were also asked what they thought 
the boy would be like in the eighth grade (several 
years in the future), specifically whether they 
thought he would be a troublemaker. Their answers 
could range from "yes, for sure" to "no, not really." 
Here, again, the two groups differed significantly. 
Entity theorists felt it was likely that he would be a 
troublemaker in the years to come, with their re- 
sponses falling clearly toward the "yes, for sure" end 
of the scale. In contrast, incremental theorists ap- 
peared to suspend judgment on this issue, with their 
responses falling in the middle of the scale. 
Thus, entity theorists, in line with their theory, be- 
lieved that the traits they had seen the boy display on 
his first day in the school were the traits he would 
continue to display in the near and distant future. Incre- 
mental theorists, in contrast, perhaps giving more 
weight to the unique pressures the boy was under, did 
not see his behavior as necessarily predictive of how he 
would be in the future. 
Not only do entity theorists believe that trait-relevant 
behaviors are relatively stable, they also believe that 
trait-relevant behaviors tend to be relatively consistent 
across a variety of situations. In one study (Chiu, Parker, 
et al., 1994, Study I), our participants (college students) 
were given information about how people acted in one 
situation and were asked to predict how they would act 
in a new and different situation. The items were devel- 
oped by Kunda and Nisbett (1986), and an example is: 
Suppose you observed Jack and Joe in one particular 
situation and found that Jack was more friendly than 
Joe. What do you suppose is the probability that in a 
completely different situation, you would also find 
Jack to be more friendly than Joe? 
Entity theorists in this study predicted significantly 
greater cross-situational consistency than did incre- 
mental theorists. If Jack was more friendly in one 
situation, they believed he would remain so even in a 
completely different situation. In contrast, incremental 
theorists believed that Joe was more likely to be the 
friendly one next time. In other words, knowing noth- 
ing more about these characters, incremental theorists 
seemed to assume that they were probably equally 
friendly and that their friendly behavior would even out 
over time. In this study, then, entity theorists appeared 
to view a behavior as diagnostic and predictive of 
similar behavior in a new situation, whereas incremen- 
tal theorists did not. 
In a related study (also by Chiu, Parker, et al., 1994; 
Study 2), our participants (college students) were given 
information about a person's trait and asked to predict 
behavior in a given situation. For example, they were 
told that Henry was more aggressive than Edward on 
average and were asked to estimate the likelihood that 
Henry would act more aggressively in a particular 
situation. There were 10 items that covered a variety of 
positive and negative traits. Both entity and incremen- 
tal theorists found the trait information compelling and 
predicted consistent behavior in the future, but, as 
hypothesized, entity theorists predicted significantly 
greater consistency than did incremental theorists. 
To summarize thus far, entity theorists, who believe 
in fixed traits, appear to perceive a closer correspon- 
dence between traits and actions than do incremental 
theorists. Thus, behavioral information is readily used 
to make trait inferences, and traits are readily used as 
causal explanations for behaviors. Moreover, consis- 
tent with having made inferences about broad, stable 
traits, the inferred traits are then used to predict other 
trait-relevant behavior (e.g., in the future or in new 
situations). Incremental theorists do not infer traits as 
readily and do not rely on them as much to predict 
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behavior. Instead, they tend to focus more on specific 
mediators when they seek to understand or .explain 
others' actions. 
Reactions to Negative Social Behaviors 
We have seen that entity and incremental theories of 
personality and moral character are associated with 
different patterns of judgments and attributions. Are 
these two implicit theories also related to their 
subscribers' reactions to people's social behaviors? 
In a series of studies, we found that when entity 
theorists observe people's negative behavior and make 
negative character judgments, their reactions tend to 
focus on retribution, possibly because for them, a per- 
son who has performed negative behaviors that reflect 
an enduring "immoral" disposition deserves punish- 
ment. In contrast, incremental theorists, who believe 
character is malleable and who focus more on how 
specific psychological factors may influence a 
wrongdoer's behavior (e.g., moral values or beliefs, 
feeling of insecurity, social skills), tend to favor inter- 
ventions that address these causes (e.g., reasoning with 
the wrongdoer, providing assurance or skill training). 
As a digression, it may appear that these findings are 
in conflict with predictions from other models of sanc- 
tion assignment (e.g., Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Wei- 
ner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988). For example, 
according to Weiner's model (Graham, Weiner, 
Giuliano, &Williams, 1993; Weiner et al., 1988; Zuck- 
ier & Weiner, 1993), when perceivers find out that a 
person's negative behavior is not under volitional con- 
trol, they will not hold the person responsible for the 
behavior and will therefore assign little or no punish- 
ment to the person. Thus, it can be argued that because 
entity theorists tend to think that behavior is the result 
of fixed and, hence, less controllable traits, they should 
be relatively more willing to exonerate a transgressor. 
However, it should be noted that a belief in the fixed- 
ness or uncontrollability of a trait may not necessarily 
lead to the expectancy that any specific trait-related 
behavior or outcome is also not controllable. Thus, an 
entity theorist of moral character may believe that 
individuals with a "weaker" moral character can and 
should try to act in an appropriate manner in aparticular 
situation by exercising will power or presence of mind 
or by keeping in mind the consequences of inappropri- 
ate behavior. An entity theorist of morality, then, may 
believe that although individuals do not have control 
over their character traits and although the traits incline 
them to behave in certain ways, they can exercise 
choice in any given situation as to whether to engage in 
a particular behavior. Seen in this way, our model and 
Weiner's model are not incompatible. Instead, they 
may supplement each other in making predictions 
about sanction assignment. 
Returning to the findings from our research, Erdley 
and Dweck's (1993) studies of children's judgments, 
which showed that entity theorists tended to make 
stronger global trait inferences, also provided the initial 
evidence for entity theorists' greater preference for 
retribution as a reaction to negative social behavior. 
Recall that the participants in this study were shown a 
narrated slide show about the wrongdoing of a new boy 
in school. After watching the slide show, they were 
asked to rate the amount of punishment they thought he 
deserved. As expected, entity theorists recommended 
significantly more punishment than did incremental 
theorists. Whereas incremental theorists recommended 
a "medium amount" of punishment, entity theorists 
recommended "a lot" of punishment. 
In another study, Chiu and Dweck (1994) presented 
college students with scenarios depicting children who 
did not perform the classroom duties assigned to them 
by their teacher (e.g., taking down some posters from 
the bulletin board). The participants were asked what 
they would do if they were the teacher in these situa- 
tions. Consistent with the findings obtained by Erdley 
and Dweck (1993), entity theorists recommended pun- 
ishment for the children more frequently than did incre- 
mental theorists. In contrast, incremental theorists were 
much more likely than entity theorists to adopt an 
instructional approach when they reacted to the 
children's behaviors. For example, when asked to role 
play the teacher and talk to the children, incremental 
theorists were more likely to try to understand the 
children's reason for not doing the job and to provide 
encouragement for them to carry out the assigned tasks 
in the future. 
In another recently completed study in our labora- 
tory, Israela Loeb presented college students with three 
scenarios in which they were victims of hurtful or 
harmful acts (e.g., along-term partner left them with no 
explanation, somebody stole their study notes for an 
important examination). For each scenario, students 
were asked to indicate how they would respond. Entity 
theorists expressed a much stronger desire to retaliate 
and harm the perpetrator than did incremental theorists. 
For example, they expressed significantly stronger 
agreement with such statements as "Frankly, I would 
try to hurt [the perpetrator] when the opportunity comes 
along" or "I would seriously consider aggression to- 
ward [the perpetrator] ." They also agreed that the over- 
all goal of their reaction would be to punish the 
perpetrators for the suffering and loss that they caused, 
which was the goal that received the lowest degree of 
endorsement from incremental theorists. 
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In contrast, incremental theorists, although also quite 
upset, focused more than entity theorists on understand- 
ing and educating the perpetrators. They agreed (to a 
significantly greater extent than entity theorists) with 
statements indicating that they would feel sorry for the 
perpetrators, they would think there were strong situa- 
tional reasons for what the perpetrators did, and they 
would try to understand and forgive them. Relative to 
entity theorists, they also agreed more strongly that the 
overall goal of their reaction would be to educate the 
perpetrators ("I would focus on changing and educating 
the perpetrators, explaining to them the consequences 
of their behavior and how they can improve."), which 
was the goal that showed the lowest degree of endorse- 
ment by entity theorists. 
Finally, in research by Gervey, Chiu, Hong, and 
Dweck (1993), participants were asked to play the role 
of jurors, presented with trial summaries, and asked to 
render verdicts. In one of the studies, participants were 
also asked what they thought the primary purpose of 
imprisonment was. In response to this question, signif- 
icantly more entity theorists than incremental theorists 
said retribution, and significantly more incremental 
theorists said rehabilitation. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that not only 
does an entity versus incremental theory of character 
predict a greater tendency to make trait judgments or 
attributions, it also predicts a preference for retribution 
versus education or remediation as a reaction to nega- 
tive behavior. Thus, in the domains of both intelli- 
gence and character, entity and incremental theories 
are associated with different patterns of judgments and 
reactions. 
The Causal Role of Implicit Theories 
Given these robust findings, our research has begun 
to address the causal role of implicit theories in judg- 
ments and reactions. In his dissertation research, 
Bergen (199 1) successfully induced college students to 
adopt one of the two implicit theories of intelligence by 
presenting them with a "scientific article" that com- 
pellingly argued for either an entity or an incremental 
view of intelligence. The results demonstrated that 
participants who had received the entity theory induc- 
tion showed more evidence of a helpless reaction to 
failure. In a recently completed study, we used a similar 
technique (presenting compelling evidence for an en- 
tity or incremental theory of character via fictitious 
scientific articles) to induce college students to adopt 
either an entity or an incremental theory of character. 
In this study, participants were randomly assigned to 
read one of the two articles in a "reading comprehen- 
sion experiment." They were then given the behavior 
prediction questionnaire used in the Chiu, Parker, et al. 
(1994) studies that were previously described. Specif- 
ically, the participants were asked to predict the likeli- 
hood that a person with a particular trait would perform 
in a trait-consistent fashion in a new situation. The 
findings revealed that participants who were led to 
adopt an entity theory believed that there was a signif- 
icantly greater likelihood that aperson with a particular 
trait would behave in a trait-consistent manner in a new 
situation than did participants who were led to adopt an 
incremental theory. 
In summary, these studies have begun to show that 
in both the intellectual and moral domains, some of the 
judgments and reactions associated with implicit theo- 
ries can be experimentally induced by manipulating 
participants' implicit theories. These findings are con- 
sistent with the idea that implicit theories may play a 
causal role in the patterns of judgments and reactions 
forementioned. In addition, given the fact that we have 
been successful in manipulating theories, these find- 
ings suggest that it is more appropriate to view implicit 
theories and their allied judgment and reaction patterns 
as relatively stable but malleable personal qualities, 
rather than as fixed dispositions. 
Other New Directions 
The implicit theories model has taken our research 
in a number of new directions. We briefly describe 
two of them--one growing out of the achievement 
work and the other growing out of the social judg- 
ment work. 
Motivational Patterns in Young 
Children 
First, our model has begun to illuminate the motiva- 
tional patterns of young children. It had been widely 
believed that children below the age of 8 or 9 were not 
vulnerable to helpless reactions in the face of failure 
(see Dweck & Elliott, 1983; Stipek & Mac Iver, 1989, 
for a review of this position). Younger children, it was 
reasoned, do not yet have notions of intelligence as a 
fixed trait and therefore will not see failure as a reflec- 
tion of this trait and thus fall into a helpless pattern. 
Indeed, it was argued, young children may not even 
have a clear idea of what intelligence is. 
Nevertheless, in a series of studies (Cain & Dweck, 
in press; Heyman, Dweck, & Cain, 1992; Smiley & 
Dweck, in press; see also Dweck, 1991, for a review), 
we have shown that children as young as preschoolers 
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and kindergartners show every aspect of the helpless 
pattern: negative self-attributions, lowered expectan- 
cies, negative affect, decreased persistence, and a lack 
of constructive strategies. Moreover, this helpless syn- 
drome occurs in a sizable number of these children 
when they encounter salient failure or criticism on tasks 
that are meaningful to them. However, these children 
do not simply think they are dumb when they fail; they 
think they are bad (Heyman, Dweck, & Cain, 1992). 
That is, failure or criticism for their work leads them to 
question their overall goodness and, perhaps, worth 
(see Burhans & Dweck, in press). Moreover, compared 
to children who display the more mastery-oriented 
pattern, these children tend to view bad behavior as a 
stable characteristic of the self (see Heyman et al., 
1992). In other words, when one looks directly at the 
domains and the attributes that are relevant to young 
children's lives-they are on the thick of socialization, 
being taught what is good and bad, right and wrong- 
one gains a clearer picture of their motivational con- 
cerns and response patterns. Moreover, it appears that 
our model provides a good description of these pat- 
terns: A belief in stable goodness-badness predicts a 
tendency to blame this trait in the face of failure and to 
display a helpless reaction. Young children who do not 
believe in stable goodness-badness instead focus more 
on effort and strategy when they encounter obstacles 
or criticism and display a more mastery-oriented 
response. 
In summary, the model we developed to capture the 
motivational pattern of older individuals (i.e., their 
goals and concerns; their attributions, affect, and per- 
sistence) appears also to capture the patterns of younger 
children when one focuses on the issues that are of 
greatest relevance to them. 
The Representation and Organization 
of Social Information 
Our recent work on social judgment has begun to 
reveal individual differences in how people encode and 
organize incoming social information. Specifically, we 
are finding that entity theorists appear to tag and cate- 
gorize incoming person information in terms of its 
trait-relevant evaluative meaning. Incremental theo- 
rists, in contrast, take a less evaluative stance toward 
the information and tend to categorize persons in terms 
of such things as the goals they pursue. 
In one of our studies (Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 1994), 
we tested the hypothesis that entity theorists would 
encode incoming person information in a more evalu- 
ative manner than would incremental theorists, perhaps 
attaching a positive or negative evaluative tag to each 
piece of information. We reasoned that if entity theo- 
rists are seeking to make trait judgments ("Is this person 
competent or incompetent, moral or immoral?')), then 
coding relevant information with appropriate evalua- 
tive tags would facilitate trait decisions later. 
In the Hong et al. (1994) study, entity and incremen- 
tal theorists (implicit person theory) were given infor- 
mation relevant to the competence of a pilot 
trainee-specifically, 20 scores he had earned on the 
subscales of a pilot aptitude test. To test for evaluative 
encoding, we later used the high and low test scores in 
a priming task. If the scores had acquired clear evalua- 
tive meaning, then high scores presented as primes 
should facilitate responding to positive words (e.g., 
lovely) and should retard responding to negative words 
(e.g., gruesome). In the same vein, low scores should 
facilitate responding to subsequent negative words and 
should retard responding to positive ones. This method 
was adapted from Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, and 
Pratto (1992), who showed that positive and negative 
attitude objects (e.g., sunshine or rats) had these effects 
when used as primes. 
The results showed that the high and low scores had 
the predicted priming effects for entity theorists, indi- 
cating that the scores had acquired clear evaluative 
meaning for them and functioned as attitude objects. In 
contrast, the scores had no impact on the responding of 
incremental theorists. These results support the idea 
that entity theorists code information in a way that may 
facilitate trait judgments. 
In a series of studies by Chiu, Sacks, and Dweck 
(1994), we tested the hypothesis that entity and in- 
cremental theorists would use different bases for 
categorizing people, with entity theorists using trait 
information as the major basis for judging people as 
similar or dissimilar and incremental theorists using 
more mediational information, such as people's goals, 
as the major basis for judging similarity or dissimilar- 
ity. In one study, trait and goal information about each 
target person was directly and explicitly provided, but 
in another study, participants simply read a number of 
comic strips from which trait and goal information 
could be inferred. In both studies, entity and incremen- 
tal theorists (implicit person theory) were asked to rate 
the similarity and dissimilarity of the various target 
persons. The results from both studies provided clear 
evidence that entity theorists used traits (e.g., compe- 
tence, morality) as the major basis for judging similar- 
ity and thus as the basis for organizing their impressions 
of the people. In contrast, the results showed clearly that 
incremental theorists used goals as the major basis 
for judging people as similar. The findings thus pro- 
vided strong evidence for the idea that entity and 
incremental theorists differ in how they organize 
person information. 
IMPLICIT THEORIES 
Taken together, this line of work has begun to 
suggest that, in keeping with their differential em- 
phases on traits versus more specific mediating pro- 
cesses, entity and incremental theorists may encode 
and organize incoming social information in differ- 
ent ways. 
Some Possible Linkages in the 
Nomological Net 
Because the implicit theories discussed in this article 
are relatively recent constructs in the literature, it is 
important to establish a nomological net (Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955) that links these constructs to other indi- 
vidual difference constructs. As noted earlier, implicit 
theories of human attributes are statistically indepen- 
dent of generalized attitudes toward the self (self-con- 
fidence, self-esteem), other people, and the world (see 
Tables 3, 4, and 5). They are also independent of 
attitudinal syndromes such as authoritarianism, liberal- 
ism, and conservatism. The statistical independence 
from these measures indicates that the effects of im- 
plicit theories on judgments and reactions are not me- 
diated by these other beliefs or attitudes. Instead, the 
group differences in judgments and reactions pre- 
viously described appear to be directly predicted by 
beliefs about the nature of human attributes and may 
result from the different processing frameworks set up 
by these implicit theories. 
However, the relations between implicit theories and 
other process-oriented individual differences such as 
attributional style (Peterson et a]., 1982), uncertainty 
orientation (Sorrentino, Short, & Raynor, 1984), the 
need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), the need 
for closure (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), and 
the personal need for structure (Neuberg & Newsom, 
1993) have not yet been established. In our view, im- 
plicit theories may form a theoretically interesting no- 
mological net with these individual differences. In this 
context, however, it is important to point out two sig- 
nificant differences between implicit theories and these 
other process-oriented constructs. First, by definition, 
an entity versus incremental theory refers only to the 
assumption individuals make about the fixedness or 
malleability of the human attributes in question. This 
definition does not contain a processing style compo- 
nent or a motivational component, although subscrib- 
ing to either theory may lead to certain processing 
strategies and certain processing goals (see Dweck, in 
press; Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993). Thus, the con- 
struct in and of itself has little overlap with individual 
differences in processing style or motivational set at 
either the definitional or assessment level. Second, 
implicit theories are domain specific whereas most 
other process-oriented individual differences are not. 
Having made these distinctions, we nonetheless pre- 
dict that implicit theories will be associated with as- 
pects of attributional style (e.g., making internal trait 
attributions in the relevant domain). Indeed, the pre- 
viously described studies consistently showed that an 
entity theory in a particular domain is positively asso- 
ciated with the tendency to make internal, global, and 
stable (trait) interpretations of behavior and outcomes 
in that domain. However, our model portrays causal 
attributions as part of a system of beliefs that begins 
with implicit theories about the attributes in question. 
In our model, a belief in fixed traits is what leads to a 
focus on such traits as causal explanations for actions 
and outcomes. Thus, although the attributions that are 
made may well be the important mediators of subse- 
quent reactions (Weiner, 1985), we propose that these 
attributional tendencies are set up by people's implicit 
theories. 
The findings we have described here also suggest 
that an entity theory portrays a social world that is 
relatively stable and predictable. Thus, compared to 
incremental theorists, who subscribe to a world view 
that is more dynamic and complex, entity theorists may 
believe closure is more easily attainable. Indeed, in a 
recent study conducted in our laboratory by Lisa 
Sorich, entity theorists agreed (and agreed significantly 
more strongly than did incremental theorists) with 
statements asserting that one can diagnose a person's 
moral character quickly and easily. In contrast, incre- 
mental theorists' mean response fell on the disagree- 
ment side of the scale. Entity theorists' belief in a 
relatively simpler reality that allows for rather rapid 
closure suggests the possibility that, relative to incre- 
mental theorists, entity theorists may exhibit a greater 
need for closure, a lower uncertainty orientation, and a 
lower need for cognition in the course of social know- 
ing. Finally, because lack of structure is antithetical to 
the orderly relations implied by a fixed reality, entity 
theorists may also have a higher personal need for 
structure in the relevant domain than do incremental 
theorists. 
In summary, although implicit theories and other 
process-oriented individual differences are conceptu- 
ally distinct and operationally independent constructs, 
they may be related to each other in interesting ways. 
Theoretical Implications 
We have shown that people's assumptions about the 
fixedness or malleability of human attributes predict 
the way they seek to know their social reality, as well 
as the way in which that reality is experienced and 
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responded to. Moreover, we have shown that judg- 
ments and reaction in the intellectual, social, and moral 
domains fall into similar patterns. Our model may thus 
be seen as having a number of implications for under- 
standing motivational, personality, and social percep- 
tion processes. 
First, in terms of motivational processes, the model 
predicts the goals that individuals tend to pursue, how 
they pursue them, and how effectively they pursue 
them. Specifically, we have shown that in the achieve- 
ment domain, entity theorists are more oriented than 
incremental theorists toward performance goals- 
goals that reflect a concern with competence judg- 
ments. In contrast, incremental theorists are more 
oriented toward learning goals- goals that reflect a 
concern with skill acquisition. In addition, we have 
shown that different patterns of self-judgment, affect, 
and persistence are associated with the two theories. In 
short, goal pursuit can be seen as defining motivated 
behavior (Cantor &Harlow, 1994; Pervin, 1983,1989), 
and implicit theories appear to predict important aspect 
of goal pursuit in the intellectual domain. 
In the social domain, we have shown that the 
different theories predict an orientation toward trait 
judgments and attributions versus more specific me- 
diational inferences and explanations. Although we 
have not studied goals directly here, we have seen 
that entity and incremental theorists appear to encode 
and organize social information in different ways- 
ways that suggest they are seeking to make these 
different types of judgments. We have also seen that 
entity and incremental theorists have different goals 
in dealing with a wrongdoer-retribution versus ed- 
ucation. Thus, in the social domain as well, implicit 
theories may illuminate the goals of individuals' 
social perception and action (Kruglanski, 1990). 
The model also has implications for understanding 
personality processes in that we have demonstrated 
clear individual differences in patterns of judgment and 
reactions and shown that these differences are tied to 
people's implicit theories. Indeed, a major goal of 
personality research is to identify potentially important 
patterns of thoughts, feelings, and actions and to link 
them to underlying psychological causes (see Cantor & 
Harlow, 1994; Mischel & Shoda, in press). We hope 
that our model has provided a step in that direction. 
Finally, we believe our model has implications for 
understanding social perception processes. Much of the 
current research suggests that trait judgment is the 
major aim of social perception or that trait judgments 
are the predominant form of social inference and expla- 
nation (Gilbert & Jones, 1986; Nisbett, 1980; Uleman, 
1987). Our work suggests that this is more true for some 
people than for others-that is, for entity theorists more 
than incremental theorists. As the research we have 
reported indicates, incremental theorists often focus on 
more specific mediational processes in their social in- 
ferences and explanation. Models of social perception 
thus need to take account of alternative goals and 
modes of social inference (Kruglanski, 1990; Trope, 
1986, 1989; Wyer & Gordon, 1984). 
In summary, although many implications of the 
model remain to be investigated, the findings to date 
suggest that it may have the potential to shed light on a 
variety of processes of interest to psychologists. 
The World From Two Perspectives: 
Some Concluding Thoughts 
The philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (1938; see 
also Johnson, Germer, Efran, & Overton, 1988) distin- 
guished between a static world view and a dynamic 
world view. These two distinct views of reality differ 
in terms of (a) their core ontological assumption about 
the nature of reality (whether it is static or evolving), 
and (b) their epistemological approach to knowing this 
reality (whether the reality is best known by quantify- 
ing and measuring its unchangeable dispositions or by 
analyzing its dynamic processes). 
In many ways, an entity versus incremental theory of 
human nature can be seen as related to the general 
"static" versus "dynamic" world view described by 
Whitehead. On the ontological level, the more static, 
entity view of human nature accords a fixed quality to 
human attributes. Human attributes, now viewed as 
internal entities, are similar to physical objects in the 
sense that they both can be readily measured. Indeed, 
the epistemological approach in this view often entails 
measurement or quantification of these entities. 
As our research demonstrates, subscribing to a static, 
entity world view has both advantages and disadvan- 
tages. Within a static view of reality, fixed traits orga- 
nize the individual's phenomenology; there is close 
correspondence between traits and actions-traits en- 
gender actions, which in turn imply traits (see Hong, 
1994). This view of the human reality has the advantage 
of being parsimonious, but it is not without its potential 
cost. As we have seen, in the face of aversive events, 
the sweeping trait inferences entity theorists tend to 
make may sometimes lead to self-stigmatization and 
ineffective striving. 
In contrast, on the ontological level, a malleable 
theory sees human attributes as dynamic properties that 
can be developed. On the epistemological level, to 
understand the dynamic nature of the human reality, 
one cannot rely solely on the measurement of human 
attributes at a particular moment in a particular context. 
IMPLICIT THEORIES 
Instead, knowing the human reality requires that we 
understand the specific psychological processes that 
mediate behavior and the behavioral processes that 
mediate outcomes. 
This dynamic, incremental view of human reality, as 
we have seen, may result in a lower degree of certainty 
when making behavioral predictions. Indeed, to 
achieve the same degree of certainty in making behav- 
ioral predictions that entity theorists have, incremental 
theorists would likely need to sample behavior across 
situations and over time (to gain a picture of an 
individual's patterns of mediated behavior). This 
means that incremental theorists may need to engage in 
more complex and effortful analyses to attain the level 
of certainty that entity theorists attain with less process- 
ing effort. Moreover, because human attributes are 
viewed as malleable, a high degree of certainty or 
closure may never be possible. However, compared to 
the static view, this view allows more room for change, 
and the mediational analysis fostered by this view may 
also suggest mechanisms for change. Indeed, as we 
have seen, this view may reduce the likelihood of 
helpless responding and promote mastery-oriented 
coping in the face of aversive events. 
In conclusion, entity and incremental theories appear 
to orient their subscribers to see the same world from 
two different perspectives. As our research has shown, 
implicit theories consistently predict the different ways 
in which identical events will be construed and coped 
with. 
Notes 
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